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II. The SmithsoniLln Agrcomcnt and Related Neqotiations on 
Trade and DcfPnse 
The Smithsonian Agreement of the Group of Ten followed 
a period of international monetary adjustment, involving a 
generalized system of floating (but not freely floating) 
exchange rates, during 1971. The Agreement consisted of 
a series of interrelated measures designed to help resolve 
balance of payments problems, to restore more settled 
conditions to the exchange markets, and to provide a frame-
work from which longer-term reform could evolve. It was 
also agreed that discussions should be promptly undertaken 
on measures for reform of the monetary system over the 
longer term, and several areas of reform to which attention 
should be directed were identified. l/ 
The agreement on "near-term" issues comprised: 
--a new pattern of basic exchange rate relationships 
among the countries concerned; 
--provisional arrangement~ to permit up to 2-1/4 
percent margins of excr.ange rate fluctuation above 
and below the new exchange rates; 
--recognition that trade arrangements are a relevant 
factor in assuring lasting equilibrium in the inter-
national economy; 
--agreement by the United States to propose to the 
Con~rPss a suitable means for devaluing the dcll~r 
in terms of gold as soon as a related set of short-
term trade expansion measures were available for 
Congressional scrutiny; an<l 
--agrcc:nent by the United States to suppress immediately 
the 10 percent import surcharge and related pro-
visions of the Job Devclop:nent Credit • 
.r.. Exchange Rate Realignnent 
During the week following the Agreement, the Group of 
ren participants individually announced the exchange rates 
and exchange rate policies to which they had agreed. The 
Government of Canada announced that it would not immediately 
set a new fixed rate for the Canadian dollar, but instead 
would maintain temporarily a floating exchange rate and 
would permit fundamental market forces to establish the ex-
change rate without intervention except as required to 
. maintain orderly conditions. Wider margins were adopted 
by the other foreign me:nbcrs of the group. The changes, 
and the new pattern of exchange rates for the U.S. dollar, 
are sun."llari~ed in the t<lble below. Annex 3 provides 
calculations of the average appreciation of certain foreign 
currencies vis a vis the dollar. 
1/ The text of the Co~~unique issued at the conclusion of 
the Smith~onian Agreement appears at Annex 2. 




fror.1 !MF ciation Currency 
Type Parity of Against Units 
0£ v. April 30, U.S. Per Dollar 
'~t: 1971 ~/ Dollar 5,6/ Country Rate Old ?!ew 
-
Belgium Central 1/ +2.76 +11.57 SOBF 44.eBF 
Canada Float * * * * 
France Par 0.00 + 8.57 5.SSFF 5.12FF 
Germany Central +4.61 +13.57 3.66DM 3.22Da 
Italy Central -1.00 + 7.48 625L 581. SL 
Japan Central. +7.66 +16.88 360¥ 308¥ 
Netherlands Central +2.76 +11.57 3.62G 3.24G 
Sweden Central -1:00 + 7. 4 9 5.17K 4. 81K 
Swi tzer1a·nc1 Par 2/ +4.89 +13.88 4.37SF 3. 84SF 
United Kingdom Par o.oo + 8.57 .42:fi .38£ 
United States Par -7.89 ii 0.00 * * 
* Not applicable. 
!/ "Central rates" have been established in some cases, in lieu 
of new par values, as i:he effective rates around which cur-
rency values will be maintained within certain margins pending 
formal par value changes. 
6/ 
Switzerland is not a rri~rnber of the I!".F. 
Expressed as percent change in grams of gold per currency unit. 
If approved by the Congress. 
Expressed as percent change in U.S. cents per foreign currency 
unit. 
All clrn.ngcs are computed on the basis of par values of April 3C, 
1971. 
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The Group of Ten participants recognized th~t their 
agreement would trigger decisions on exchange rates by 
most other countries and indicated their view that it was 
particular1y important that no country seek improper co~-
pctitivc advantage through its exchange rate policies. 
Changes in parities could be justified only on the basis 
of an objective appraisal which established a position of 
disequilibrium. 
As of January 20, the International Monetary Fund had 
received indications from all but five of its members of 
their decisions on their exchange rate systems. 1/ All 
proposed exchange rate changes have been examined by the 
IHF in accordance with the principle outlined above and 
in accordance with the Fund's own Articles of Agreement, 
and the Fund has taken such formal action as was appropriate 
in each case to enable the rates concerned to be implenentcd. 
B. Negotiations on Trade Expan~ion Measures 
The Smithsonian Agr~:ement noted that urgent negotiations 
were under way between t:iie United States and the Commission 
of the European Cor.ununi t :·_es, Japan and Canada "to resolve 
pending shore-term issues at the earliest possible date" ••• 
and "to -establish an appropriate agenda for considering 
more basic issues in a framework of mutual cooperation 
in the course of 197 2 an·-'- beyond." These negotiations 
addressed themselves bott to a fra:-nework for negotiation.of 
major trade issues, including issues which the United States 
considers of critical imrortance, and to a series of short-
term questions. 
One outcome of the :·,egotiations was agreement between 
the United States and Japun to initiate and actively 
support in the GATT duri:1g 1973 (subject to such internal 
authorization as may be required) multilateral and com-
prehensive negotiations with a vi0w to the exchange.and 
greater liberalization c:f world trade. A similar agreement 
has been reached with the European Communities subject to 
approval by its Council. 
1/ 
. 
Exchange rate changes and the new dollar rate for each 
IHF member country are listed in Annex 4. 





The talks also resulted in a series of practical steps 
to remove trade obstacles that have become an irritant in 
trade relations. These issues have by no means been fully 
resolved, but a beginning has been made. The Japanese 
Governncnt hc1s decided to undertu:ke a series of trc1de 
liberc1lization steps of im.~cdiate value to the United States. 
Doth countries hv.vc agreed to join in efforts during 1972 
within CATT toward the removal of some trade barriers 
leading to comprehensive trade negotiations in 1973. An 
agreement in substance with the European Communities sub-
ject to approval by its Council covers similar issues. 
In short, a broad understanding has been reached for 
future negotiations in a time frame that takes into account 
the fact that international trade is undergoing an adjustment 
' process initiated by recent comprehensive and substantial 
currency realignments. In the case of Canada, the parallel 
short-term negotiations, dealing mainly with certain bilateral 
~grcements and understandings that no longer fit the facts 
of our economic relationship, have not been brought to a 
.:;uccessf1,1l conclusion. 
The inunediate reduction of some tariff and non-tariff 
· barriers by our trading partners, apart from their immediate 
value, is evidence of their intent to minimize economic 
friction and expand trade in reciprocal negotiations. These 
tnilateral steps do not completely fulfill U.S. desires, but 
t.:>gether with the commitment to negotiate reductions in 
i:rade barriers over the longer term they do constitute 
1:ecognition that improvements must be made in the trading 
::.ystem. 
/,hort-Term Measures 
The greatest progress towtird liberalization in.the 
immedinte future with tangible benefits for the United States 
will be made by Japan. For several years there has been a 
large and growing deficit in our trade with Japan, partially 
aggrnvatcd by the maintenance of trade barriers initiated 
during an earlier relative "€akness in the Japanese 
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external position. While many important restrictions remain, 
the actions, supplementing the yen appreciation of 16.9 
p~rcent relative to the dollnr, represent a useful contri-
bution towards bringing the United States-Japan trade 
imbalance into reasonable adjustment. They are also a 
welcome sign that Japan wishes to participate more fully 
in international efforts to reduce barriers. 
With respect to agricultural products, Japan will in-
crease the quantity of imports permitted under quota of 
fresh oranges, orange and grapefruit juice, high quality 
beef; eliminate the duty on soybeans and tallow; and reduce 
the duties on turkey meat, soybean meal, vegetable oils 
and some 10 other products. A duty free tariff quota will 
be established for feeder cattle. The effective date for 
these changes will be April 1, 1972, the beginning of the 
Japanese fiscal year. 
On industrial products, Japan will reduce tariffs on 
April 1, 1972, on automobiles, computers, computer peripheral 
equip~ent, machine tools, color film, X-ray film and some 
30 other industrial products. Japan will also reduce the 
1.nternal excise tax on large and medium sized automobiles. 
Effective February 1st, Japan removed import quota restric-
~ions on light aircraft and light aircraft parts, computer 
peripheral equipment (not including memory or terminal 
devices}, radar and radio navigational equipment for air-
craft; light and heavy oil. A U.S. technical team will 
visit Japan this spring to discuss liberalization of res-
trictions on imports of computers and computer equipment 
):n addition, Japan will·grant more liberal treatment to the 
<!stablish."nent in Japan by U.S. firms of wholly-owned 
:,ubsidiar ies for importation, wholesaling and servicing. 
!:ome actions are also being taken to reduce other Japanese 
"f1on-tariff barriers. 
The European Communities have also agreed in principle 
on some short-term measures that are pending approval of 
the Council of the European Communities. 
~· The U.S. has agreed to participate in bilateral 
antidurnping discussions with the Japanese at the technical 
level. The United States has agreed to consider proposing 
the elimination of the "Final List" (Section 402 (a) of the 
Tariff Act) method of custo~s valuation, contingent upon 
reciprocal actions by other countries. The United States 
may moderate its inspection measures of Japanese cann~d 
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tuna as determined by the effectiveness of Japanese measures 
in meeting U.S. laws and regulations concerning decomposed 
canned tuna. 
The U.S. has been concerned that certain trading 
arrangements with Canada no longer fairly_reflect.the . 
economic circumstances surrounding econo~1c relationships 
between our two countries. While it has not yet been 
posziblc to achieve appropriate balance in these arrange-
ments, the United States will seek appropriate means of 
reducing imbalances in trade agreements with that country. 
Conclusion 
These negotiations have by no means settled the 
major issues outstanding in the field of international trade. 
Nevertheless, a beginning ha~ been made. Certainly, 
there is greater recognition today of both the need for 
further progress and the dangers implicit in failure to 
achieve that progress. We look forward to major trading 
nations joining with us in seeking future steps to 
revitalize the world trading system. 
C. Defense Financing Arrangements 
The President's announcement of August 15, 1971, 
included the statement: 
•Now that othe.:· nations are economically 
strong, the time ha:, come for them to bear their 
fair share of the burden of defending freedom 
around the world." 
The implication was that the persistent U.S. payments 
problems were caused par l_ly by the high level of U.S. 
defense expenditures abrr>ad. If some of those def ense bur-
dens could be borne by ether countries, the shift required 
in other U.S. accounts, includ~ng trade, would be smaller. 
Some reduction of defense expenditures overseas could 
be :>:pected as we withdrew from Vietnam. However, these 
savings could be dissipated by rising prices and the in-
creased cost of foreign currencies. Important imbalances 
have r~mained within Europe. Thus we felt justified in 
proposing that Europe carry a larger share of the common 
defense burden, which would mean some increise in their 
defense responsibilities, greater contributions to the cost 
of maintaining U.S. forces in their areas, or a combination 
of both. 
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The U.S. wants to maintain fully the strength of the 
alliance. Unilateral reductions in U.S. forces might 
be followed by reductions in the forces of our allies 
rather than a compensating increase. Reductions should be 
the subject of negotiations with Warsaw Pact powers, not the 
result of unilateral action. The U.S. view ~~s that forces 
of our EuropPan allies needed to be strengthc:.r d. Thus, 
a number of conflicting objectives had to be :·~conciled . 
. 
The result so far has been the signing of a new agree-
ment for partially offsetting the cost of U.S. forces in 
Germany and announcement by our European allies that they 
intend to increase expenditures on their own defense forces 
by more than $1 billion in 1972. These agreements are 
steps toward maintaining the strength of our common defense 
·with a smaller proportionate burden on the United States. 
However, the increased expenditure by our European allies 
on their own defense forces, except as it may involve pro-
curement from the U.S., will not directly reduce our payments 
deficit. Nor will the share of Europc&n gross national 
products spent on defen~e be larger than in previous years. 
Consequently, this area will need further examination 
and action in the year ahead. The alternativP. wnuln be 
to achieve the adjustment needed in our international 
payments balance almost entirely in the trade sector of 
the balance of payments. Our trading partners muy find 
preferable new arrangements enabling the U.S. to maintain 
its forces in Europe without imposing strain on ·:he inter-
national payments balance, that is, with consequrnces for 
the payments balance no different from those of 1:aintaining 
the same forces in the United States. 
.; 
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